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APPLYING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ABROAD,
FROM THE ERA OF THE U.S. FOUNDING TO
THE MODERN AGE
Alina Veneziano*
ABSTRACT

This Essay traces the extent to which constitutional protections
have been extended to foreign nationals within or outside the
territory of the United States, as well as to U.S. nationals abroad.
The United States Supreme Court’s metric for making such
determinations has evolved. Early analyses were grounded in
considerations reflective of strict territorialism and citizenship.
However, technology and globalization have challenged the
traditional notion that the Constitution applies only to those within
the United States. The question of whether the Constitution follows
its citizens when they enter foreign territory has been hotly debated,
particularly as the Supreme Court has struggled to answer questions
implicating the United States-Mexico border and Guantanamo Bay.
It seems not only fair and equitable, but also logical, that such
constitutional guarantees be afforded to U.S. nationals when not
within United States territory. But on what criteria should such
determinations be based?
This Essay traces case law on the extraterritorial applicability of
the U.S. Constitution and criticizes the Supreme Court’s failure in the
Hernandez decision to dispel inconsistencies and loopholes. In doing
so, this Essay sets forth a modified approach that would accomplish
the following goals: (1) ensure ease of consistent application; (2)
create a clear standard for lower courts; (3) recognize the Executive’s
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legitimate foreign policy and national security objectives; (4) reduce
the likelihood of infringing on the sovereignty of foreign
governments; and (5) provide fair administration of certain
constitutional guarantees to foreigners.
Many scholars have urged that Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic
approach should control analyses of constitutional extensions, while
other scholars have promoted Boumediene’s functional approach for
the issue. Thus, as they have argued, either the formalistic or
functional approach should control in its entirety. However, these
approaches are not mutually exclusive. This Essay maintains that
context matters: While citizenship and enemy status may remain
relevant, it is a nuanced understanding of the territory prong that
should be the most determinative factor in judicial analyses
concerning constitutional extensions. An approach that emphasizes
flexibility and sovereignty, while also considering consistency and
fairness in the application of the Constitution to foreign nationals, is
the ideal strategy and the one promoted by this Essay.
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INTRODUCTION
With the fixation on geographic borders and the desire to shift and
affect jurisdiction in a globalized world, “this sort of reverse forum
shopping by governments is much easier than it would have been in
the past.” 1

One might assume that considerations of race, national origin, or
citizenship are inconsequential to the application of the United States
government’s laws and regulations. However, the geographic reach of
the Constitution, extended on the basis of these factors, has long been
a debated topic. 2 This debate concerning the extraterritorial 3 reach
of U.S. constitutional protections upon foreign nationals have existed
throughout U.S. history, in contexts ranging from the Second World
War and the Cold War to international drug cartels at the southern
U.S. border to the War on Terror. 4 Foreign nationals present in the

1. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 207 (2009).
2. See Eva Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and
Foreign Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 232
(2014) (“As the United States has expanded its footprint in the international order,
the question of whether the Constitution should follow the flag has taken on
increased importance.”); see also Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case
Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 467 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, A
Textual and Historical Case] (“Americans have long debated where, and for whose
benefit, the Constitution applies.”); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909, 911 (1991) [hereinafter Neuman, Whose Constitution?] (“The domain
of constitutionalism has always been contested, and it has grown as the nation has
grown.”).
3. Extraterritorial is defined as the extension of U.S. law to regulate the conduct
or effects, or both, that occur outside the territory of the United States. See CURTIS
A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 167 (2d ed. 2015)
(defining extraterritoriality as “the application of federal and state law to conduct
that takes place at least partially outside the territory of the United States . . . ”); see
also Zachary D. Clopton, Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative
Study, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217, 218 (2013) (“[E]xtraterritoriality refers to
the application of the laws of one country to persons, conduct, or relationships
outside of that country.”).
4. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 232. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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United States “have been subjected to selective interrogation,
registration, detention, and deportation on the basis of their national
identity.” 5
The issue for the courts has been whether such constitutional
provisions apply in cases where “some of the relevant facts are
located outside the territorial borders of the state.” 6 While the
traditional cannons of interpretation can provide some guidance, case
law reveals that the Supreme Court ultimately does not rely on this
approach when deciding whether to extend the reach of the
Constitution beyond the United States, because of the unique nature
of constitutional questions. 7 For instance, statutes can be more easily
amended if the Supreme Court decides an issue contrary to
congressional intent, whereas constitutional provisions are “extremely
difficult to amend.” 8 Therefore, the judiciary examines them
differently.
U.S. courts are still struggling to answer the broader question of
how far constitutional protections should extend — a question with
tremendous historical significance. During the Civil War, for
instance, constitutional protections did not extend to military
enemies, leaving courts closed to enemy combatants during and after
the war. 9 This meant that all persons residing in the enemy nations
“were out of the protection of the Constitution, no matter their
citizenship.” 10 Thus, contrary to popular belief, citizenship was not
the determining factor; rather, determinations were made based on
“formal, categorical distinctions between domestic and foreign
territory, war and peace, resident and nonresident, enemy fighter and
not, and zone of battle and elsewhere.” 11 Nor did the Constitution

5. See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional
Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 367 (2003).
6. See Clopton, supra note 3, at 218.
7. See Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United
States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2014) [hereinafter
Neuman, Extraterritoriality] (“Extraterritorial application of constitutional rules
involves a set of considerations that differ in part from those relevant to
extraterritorial application of statutory rules.”).
8. Id.
9. See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading
of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 123 (2011) [hereinafter Kent,
Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading] (“During wartime, both
civilian residents of the enemy nation and enemy combatants – wherever located –
were barred from using U.S. courts to assert legal rights.”).
10. See Andrew Kent, Citizenship and Protection, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115,
2122 (2014) [hereinafter Kent, Citizenship and Protection].
11. Id. at 2123.
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extend protections to non-U.S. nationals outside the sovereignty of
the United States during the nineteenth century. 12 Specifically,
during the nineteenth century, the United States embraced an
approach of strict territoriality. 13 Courts treated “[t]erritorial location
and domicile” as more determinative than citizenship when extending
protections. 14 This notion, however, was slowly abandoned and is
now markedly different in the twenty-first century.
Today, U.S. nationals within the United States — citizens at home
— enjoy the full protections of the Constitution. 15 Outside the United
States, however, U.S. nationals in foreign territories — citizens
abroad — enjoy limited constitutional protections due to certain
exigencies or limited government power. 16 More complex is the
stance concerning foreign nationals situated domestically or abroad.
Within the United States, foreign nationals — aliens within the
United States — the Constitution provides certain protections, such
as the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.17
Outside the United States, however, U.S. law generally does not
protect foreign nationals in a foreign state — aliens outside the
United States — from U.S. conduct abroad. 18 Common justifications
for this distinction are based on assertions that foreign nationals “do
not deserve the same rights as American citizens,” “that citizenship
makes a difference,” and the “deeply ambivalent approach of the
Supreme Court, an ambivalence matched only by the alternately
xenophobic and xenophilic attitude of the American public toward
immigrants.” 19

12. See Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading, supra
note 9, at 123.
13. See Roszell Dulany Hunter IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the
Constitution – Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. REV. 649, 653 (1986).
14. Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2118.
15. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 660.
16. Id. at 661.
17. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (holding that
resident aliens are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment); see also
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (holding that resident aliens are entitled
to the protections under the First Amendment); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39
(1915) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to the protections under the Equal
Protection Clause); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (resident
aliens are entitled to the protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to
the protections under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
18. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 666.
19. Cole, supra note 5, at 367–68.
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While it is clear that those physically present within the United
States are protected, the protections afforded to those with little or no
contact with U.S. territory are less clear, particularly where situations
involve regulating U.S. government actions, or protecting foreign
nationals outside the United States. 20 It is not surprising that the
general public presumes that non-citizens do not share the same
rights as citizens. 21 After 9/11, such concerns became even more
pressing, since the national security of the United States was at stake,
and detention schemes and Guantanamo took center stage in national
discourse. 22
If foreign nationals seeking admission to the United States are
subject to the complete and plenary power of congressional
authority, 23 the critical and complex concern is this: Whether
foreigners can be regulated by or assert the protections of the U.S.
Constitution when they are not on U.S. soil, but continue to be
affected by U.S. conduct or policies abroad. 24 As discussed below,
the Supreme Court no longer strictly adheres to the doctrine of
territoriality and instead embraces a due process, or functional,
approach. 25 Furthermore, increasing U.S. interests in “foreign
involvements” and the development of “international protection for
human rights” have tipped the scale in favor of providing extended
constitutional protections to foreign nationals from U.S. conduct
abroad. 26
This Essay traces case law on the extraterritorial applicability of
the U.S. Constitution and criticizes the Supreme Court’s failure in the
Hernandez decision to dispel inconsistencies and loopholes. In doing
so, this Essay sets forth a modified approach that would accomplish

20. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 915 (describing the
Supreme Court’s changing jurisprudence regarding U.S. government action abroad).
21. See Cole, supra note 5, at 369.
22. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 867 (2010) (“What were once regarded as
exotic issues concerning the nuances of governance in remote U.S. territories became
urgent matters of national security in the wake of the U.S. government’s global
detention scheme and the decision to operate long-term prisons at
Guantanamo . . . .”).
23. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (“[P]lenary
congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been
firmly established.”).
24. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 911 (“The current debate
primarily concerns the rights of persons harmed by United States government action
abroad, especially aliens but also United States citizens . . . .”).
25. See Dulany Hunter IV, supra note 13, at 666.
26. Id.
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the following goals: create a clear standard for lower courts and
ensure consistent application; recognize the Executive’s legitimate
foreign policy and national security objectives; reduce the likelihood
of infringing on the sovereignty of foreign governments; and provide
fair administration of certain constitutional guarantees to foreigners.
The Essay proceeds in the following manner: Part I analyzes
seminal Supreme Court cases adjudicating the scope and extent of the
Constitution’s protections. This Part also explores trends based on
strict territorialism, partial territorialism, citizenship, domestic
principles, and national security. Part II summarizes three main
approaches that the Supreme Court adopted in these situations and
offers a matrix of possible situations considering particular attendant
circumstances, such as territoriality and nationality of the claimant.
Part III examines how Supreme Court decisions have shaped the
position of the United States when deciding the extent of
constitutional guarantees. This Part also evaluates the different ways
the Supreme Court has prioritized the prongs of territoriality,
citizenship, and enemy status in various contexts, and tracks how the
law has evolved with respect to the extension of constitutional rights
abroad. Part IV recommends that the United States adopt an
approach that reconciles the underlying approaches of VerdugoThis
Urquidez’s formalism with Boumediene’s functionalism.
combined scheme would recognize the distinction between foreign
territory and controlled territory, while placing a somewhat lesser
emphasis on citizenship and even lesser focus on enemy status.
Finally, Part V elaborates upon the urban implications of the
Constitution’s scope, as well as the problems faced by states when
attempting to remedy such inconsistencies.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This Part examines the different shifts in extraterritoriality
jurisprudence and analyzes the changes in the Supreme Court’s
considerations when determining the allocation of constitutional
protections. As will be demonstrated in this Part, Supreme Court
jurisprudence has shifted away from a focus on territorialism —
basing the extension of rights on the physical location of the noncitizen in relation to the U.S. border — to an approach that
foregrounds citizenship and national security concerns.
Historically, the Supreme Court has used the rationale of presence
within geographic localities — such as differences in physicality (high
seas), social, or governmental structures — to determine whether to
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extend provisions of the Constitution to individuals from abroad.27
Indeed, the Constitution was drafted under the attendant
circumstance that it would apply primarily to “territorial nationstates” within the United States. 28 Therefore, the “distinction
between being inside and outside the borders of the United States is
not a constitutional irrelevancy.” 29 The U.S. government has also
expressed a heightened interest in regulating the conduct of those
individuals — especially non-citizens —within and outside its
borders. 30 Since the time of Constitution’s ratification, the U.S.
government acted to protect aliens, not through the allocation of
constitutional rights, but by exercising Congress’s power to enact
legislation such as those relating to naturalization. 31
The limited geographic reach of the Constitution can be traced
back to the nineteenth-century idea that the legal obligations of the
United States beyond its territory
were “incomplete” —
constitutional rights can “follow the flag,” but they “go no further.”32
However, there are strong arguments that the text of the Constitution
does in some form demonstrate an intent or willingness to extend its
force beyond the territory of the United States. For instance, the
Constitution grants Congress the power to define and punish piracy
and felonies “on the high Seas and Offenses against the Law of
Nations,” 33 to regulate commerce “with foreign Nations,” 34 and to
make all laws which shall be “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.” 35 Its discussion of the supremacy of
treaties also implies some degree of constitutional power beyond the
territory of the United States. 36
As the United States grew to be a world power, many aspects of its
legal system expanded beyond its borders, including statutes, criminal
enforcement procedures, regulatory laws, and of course, specific

27. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene
v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 269 (2009) [hereinafter Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution].
28. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 979.
29. Id.
30. See Neuman, Extraterritoriality, supra note 7, at 1444, 1469.
31. See Kent, A Textual and Historical Case, supra note 2, at 524
32. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 977.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
36. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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constitutional guarantees. 37 This expansion initially gained traction
after the World Wars and continued into the Cold War era. During
the onset of the War on Terror, the focus on regulation shifted
internally, with a more domestic orientation. 38 National security
mechanisms presented a complicated issue for the Executive: how to
react swiftly to threats to the United States and not be bound or
constrained by the mandates of the Constitution.
Beginning in the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the Executive
sought increased discretion to hold enemy combatants, whether they
were U.S. nationals or not. 39 The Supreme Court, in response,
tended to cut back such Executive discretion and based their
reasoning on a combination of territory, citizenship, and enemy status
considerations. 40
A. The Supreme Court’s Early Jurisprudence on Extraterritoriality
To determine a claimants constitutional rights, some of the earliest
Supreme Court cases relating to extraterritorial application of the
U.S. Constitution focused primarily on the particular territory in
which a claimant was located when the conduct at issue occurred and
the claimant’s citizenship. For instance, the Supreme Court’s 1891 In
re Ross decision held that U.S. nationals who are abroad do not enjoy
the same protections as U.S. nationals in the United States — a
position based on purely formalistic reasoning relating to territory,
rather than citizenship. 41 The Court noted that “[t]he Constitution
can have no operation in another country,” and to hold otherwise
would simply “be impracticable from the impossibility of obtaining a
competent grand or petit jury.” 42 Here, the Supreme Court’s
completely formalistic approach restricted constitutional protections
to the territory of the United States.
Twenty years after In re Ross was decided, the Supreme Court
addressed a series of cases between 1901 and 1922 — known as the

37. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 189.
38. Id. at 188–90.
39. See infra Section I.D. (discussing the legislative efforts to strip courts of
jurisdiction to hear certain cases, producing Executive discretion with little
constitutional bounds in Guantanamo).
40. Id. (referring to invalidating the attempts by the Legislature and Executive to
strip judicial authority to adjudicate these cases and avoid the mandates of the
Constitution).
41. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (asserting that the Constitution was
established for the United States, and not for countries beyond its territorial reach).
42. Id. at 464.
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Insular Cases — regarding territories acquired by the United States

These decisions created
during the Spanish-American War. 43
distinctions regarding the treatment of incorporated and
unincorporated territories. 44 The territories at issue were Puerto
Rico, Guam, Hawaii, American Samoa, and the Philippines. 45
One of the particularly significant Insular Cases, Downes v.
Bidwell, involved the question of whether Congress could tax imports
from Puerto Rico, an unincorporated territory, and whether the
Uniformity Clause of the Constitution applied to Puerto Rico. 46 The
Court held that Congress was able to tax the imports, subject only to
the fundamental limitations of the Constitution, which “exist rather
by inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which
Congress derives all its powers, [rather] than by any express and
direct application of its provision.” 47 The Court held so even though
it had previously ruled that Puerto Rico was considered a state and
the Constitution prohibited taxing imports from any state.48
Ultimately, the Court explained that territories like Puerto Rico were
not considered part of the United States. 49
Justice White’s concurrence articulated the distinction between
congressional authority when dealing with incorporated territories —
or those that are designed for statehood — and unincorporated
territories — where only those rights deemed fundamental would be
applicable. 50 Thus, the takeaway from the Insular Cases in general
appears to be that the Constitution applies in territories that will
become a part of the Union, but will only apply in other territories if
the Court determines those constitutional provisions are
“fundamental.” 51 The distinction made by Justice White’s

43. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901). See also Goetze v. United States,
182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v.
United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v.
N.Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
44. See Netta Rotstein, Note, Boumediene vs. Verdugo-Urquidez: The Battle for
Control over Extraterritoriality at the Southwestern Border, 93 WASH. U. L. REV.
1371, 1376 (2016).
45. Id. at 1375–76.
46. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 247–49.
47. Id. at 268, 287.
48. Id. at 256, 287.
49. See id. at 250–51.
50. Id. at 311–12.
51. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and
Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 800 (2005).
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concurrence informs the doctrine of territorial incorporation. 52 Over
one hundred years later, in Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed Justice White’s Downes concurrence and declared that the
Constitution applied completely to incorporated territories, but only
in part for unincorporated territories. 53
The Insular Cases and Boumediene’s holdings, however, are not
without disapproval.
Harvard Law Professor Gerald Neuman
criticized the Insular Cases as an exercise of illegitimate government
power that resulted from acquiring power over new territories
without the consent of the population and without affording them the
rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 54 These cases, and In re
Ross, stood for the proposition that “American citizens cannot be
tried by the federal government for capital offenses without jury trial
in Japan, but can be so tried in Puerto Rico.” 55
These holdings meant that the United States could retain
sovereignty over these island territories, but would only be bound by
the constitutional provisions that the Court determined to be
“fundamental.” 56 This was less of a territorial distinction than In re
Ross had exhibited, though the Insular Cases still did not generally
distinguish between U.S. nationals and foreign nationals. 57
B.

World War II and Changes in Extraterritorial Jurisprudence

The United States’s emergence as a world leader gave it both the
confidence and power to regulate extraterritorially. In Johnson v.
Eisentrager, for example, the Supreme Court refused to grant habeas
relief to enemy combatants held in a German prison by the U.S.
Army in the American sector of occupied Germany, because alien
combatants have no right to constitutional protections. 58 Justice
Jackson described the protections afforded to foreign nationals within

52. See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality
After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 988 (2009) [hereinafter Burnett, A
Convenient Constitution?].
53. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008).
54. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 978.
55. Id. at 979.
56. Id. at 915.
57. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2127–28.
58. See generally Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The petitioners

argued that their imprisonment violated Articles I and III of the Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment. See id. at 767; see also id. at 776 (“[T]he nonresident enemy alien,
especially one who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even this
qualified access to our courts, for he neither has comparable claims upon our
institutions nor could his use of them fail to be helpful to the enemy.”).
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U.S. history as having been on a “generous and ascending scale of
rights” that increase as the foreign national increases his or her ties to
the United States. 59 A foreign national’s presence within the United
States gives the courts the authority to extend constitutional
protections. 60 In other words, habeas relief could not be granted
here, because the prisoners were not within a territory over which the
United States exercised sovereignty and the circumstances at issue
“were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United
States.” 61 Thus, Eisentrager demonstrates the strength of the
connection between the individual and the state and asserts the
dominance of a territorial nexus over one based on citizenship. 62
The Court faced a contradiction between Eisentrager’s holding and
an earlier case involving enemy combatants, Ex parte Quirin. 63 Ex
parte Quirin, decided in 1942, involved the constitutionality of a
German saboteurs’ trial in the United States. 64 Similarly, Eisentrager
involved German nationals held as enemy combatants; thus, a
distinction between enemy and non-enemy combatant could not be
maintained after Ex parte Quirin’s assertion of jurisdiction over
Therefore, even though the territorial
enemy combatants. 65
distinction — the physical presence in the United States — was
critical, Eisentrager also made clear that certain constitutional
protections will not extend abroad whether one is an enemy alien or
non-enemy alien. Rather, constitutional protections are applicable
abroad only to U.S. citizens. Justice Jackson pronounced this
territorial distinction to justify the Court’s refusal to extend
jurisdiction to foreign nationals. 66
Justice Jackson’s formalistic holding in Eisentrager is considered a
pretext by some scholars who maintain that “the Court’s objection to
hearing the habeas petitions at issue did not turn on the fact that
Landsberg lies outside the ‘sovereignty’ of the United States,” but
was instead based on the concern that “the petitions were being filed

59. Id. at 770 (noting that the foreign national’s identity with U.S. society
increases first by “[m]ere lawful presence in the country,” then by the “preliminary
declaration of intention to become a citizen,” and finally expand in full “to those of
full citizenship upon naturalization”).
60. Id. at 771.
61. Id. at 778 (quoting, “the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and
their punishment”).
62. Id. at 769.
63. Id. at 779–80; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
64. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20–21, 48.
65. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779–80; see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
66. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 780–81.
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by enemy aliens, during a time of war, in a place outside United
States territory or its ‘territorial jurisdiction.’” 67 Other scholars have
cautioned that states may use Eisentrager’s territorial limitation of
habeas “to intentionally place detainees beyond the reach of
courts.” 68 Justice Black’s dissent foreshadowed a similar concern
when he asserted that denying habeas solely because the petitioners
were convicted and imprisoned abroad created a “broad and
dangerous principle,” which would deny courts the power to afford
constitutional protections to aliens abroad. 69 In other words, under
formalistic reasoning, the need to consider context is obviated: the
United States could easily have placed suspects in territories without
access to the judiciary, in an effort to advance its own interests, cover
up potential abuses, and evade criticism.
Reid v. Covert marks an important turning point: the Court held
that the Constitution applies in its entirety to U.S. nationals living
abroad in a foreign state. 70 In Justice Black’s plurality opinion, the
Court “reject[ed] the idea that, when the United States acts against
citizens abroad, it can do so free of the Bill of Rights.” 71 When the
United States seeks to regulate the conduct of its nationals abroad,
the Bill of Rights operates as the “shield” that protects the U.S.
national’s “life and liberty.” 72 This protection is not stripped away
even when that U.S. national is in another land. 73 Thus, these
protections do operate to restrict the conduct of the U.S. government;
after all, as the Court stated, “[t]he United States is entirely a
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed
by the Constitution.” 74
Reid’s significance lies in its abandonment of the strict, formalistic
approach adhered to by the judiciary in prior cases. The Constitution
applies wherever the U.S. government acts: it serves as the source of

67. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intra-Territorial Constitution, 2
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 369, 387 (2007).
68. See BRIAN R. FARRELL, HABEAS CORPUS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 150 (2017).
69. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 795.
70. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1957). Here, civilian wives of military
men were denied the constitutional right to a jury trial and were instead tried in a
U.S. military court for the murders of their husbands while overseas. The women
sought a writ of habeas, claiming they were entitled to a trial before a civilian jury. Id.
at 3–5.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5–6.
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the government’s authority to act. 75 While this appears to represent
the end of the “regime of strict territoriality,” 76 as set forth below, this
is not always true, especially when foreign nationals are involved.
C.

Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment Application in
Extraterritorial Jurisprudence

The extraterritorial application of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments has been interpreted more formalistically by courts,
complicating the issue of the Constitution’s extended reach and
resulting in confusion regarding guidance for the lower courts. In
Verdugo-Urquidez and Hernandez, the Court’s approach seems
counter to the jurisprudence of the Detainee Cases. 77
In Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican national was prosecuted for his
role in a Mexican narcotics-trafficking organization that smuggled
narcotics into the United States and for allegedly participating in the
murder of a DEA agent. 78 The Mexican police seized VerdugoUrquidez and extradited him to the United States. 79 The next day,
DEA agents conducted a warrantless search of his home in Mexico
while he was in U.S. custody and found records relating to his
smuggling business. 80 Verdugo-Urquidez moved to suppress the
evidence seized during the search, claiming the search by U.S. agents
violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures. 81 The district court granted the motion to
suppress, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the warrantless
search violated the Fourth Amendment. 82
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Protections against
arbitrary searches and seizures only apply to “the people” of the
United States and were not “intended to restrain the actions of the
Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States
territory.” 83 The term “the people,” unlike the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, applied only to the “class of persons who are part of a
national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient

75. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 915.
76. Id. at 965.
77. See infra Section I.D. (discussing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)).
78. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262–63 (1990).
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id. at 262–63.
81. See id. at 263.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 265–66.
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connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.” 84 Because Verdugo-Urquidez did not meet any of these
prerequisites, the Fourth Amendment constitutional protection did
not extend to him. 85
The Chief Justice grounded his conclusions in a “slippery slope”
argument: that extending the Fourth Amendment abroad in these
circumstances would have “significant and deleterious consequences
for the United States in conducting activities beyond its
boundaries.” 86 For instance, a holding in favor of Verdugo-Urquidez
could have affected the government’s ability to “respond to foreign
situations involving our national interest” and could have allowed
aliens with no connection to the United States to assert Fourth
Amendment violations in U.S. courts based on conduct in “foreign
countries or in international waters.” 87 The case seems to suggest
that foreign nationals cannot assert any constitutional protections
unless they demonstrated a connection to the territory of the United
States, which likely referred to residency or at least something more
than mere temporary custody in the United States. 88 Thus, this
opinion reflected a strict and formalistic approach to constitutional
extensions that draw a clear line between the guarantees afforded to
Nevertheless, a more
U.S. nationals and foreign nationals. 89
functional approach was on the horizon, since “pure territoriality was
no longer an option.” 90
84. Id. at 265 (citing United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292
(1904)).
85. Id. at 274–75 (“At the time of the search, he was a citizen and resident of
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and the place searched
was located in Mexico. Under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment has no
application.”).
86. See id. at 273.
87. Id. at 273–74 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
88. See id. at 272 (“When the search of his house in Mexico took place, he had
been present in the United States for only a matter of days. We do not think the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the search of premises in Mexico should
turn on the fortuitous circumstance of whether the custodian of its nonresident alien
owner had or had not transported him to the United States at the time the search was
made.”). The Court noted that in the future, restrictions on such searches and
seizures could exist, but “they must be imposed by the political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.” Id. at 275.
89. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 236 (“Reid and Verdugo-Urquidez drew a clear
fault line between citizens, whose participation in the polity entitled them to a degree
of constitutional protection abroad, and noncitizens, who were not granted such
protection.”).
90. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and
Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2038 (2005).
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In 2017, the Supreme Court considered the extraterritorial
applicability of Fourth and Sixth Amendment protections. In 2010,
Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca was fatally shot and killed by a
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent on U.S. territory, while
Hernandez was on Mexican soil. 91 The Fifth Circuit held that foreign
nationals may invoke the constitutional protections of the Fifth
Amendment for an injury caused by a U.S. agent that occurred
outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States. 92 However, the
Fifth Circuit declined to extend the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to foreign nationals in Mexico, as the foreign national
here did not have any significant voluntary connection to the territory
of the United States. 93
The Supreme Court sidestepped the Fourth Amendment issue,
noting that the question is “sensitive and may have consequences that
are far reaching.” 94 Regarding the Fifth Amendment claim, the
Court noted that qualified immunity is limited by what the officer
knew at the time of the conduct and that facts learned after the
incident is over “are not relevant.” 95 Justice Breyer dissented, noting
that the Court’s decision runs afoul of Boumediene’s functional
approach dealing with issues of extraterritorial extensions of the
Constitution. 96
Hernandez was criticized for failing to affirmatively decide whether
the claimant had a Fourth or Fifth Amendment right or whether
Mesa violated those rights. 97 Most importantly, the holding of
Hernandez ignored one crucial factor underscored in Boumediene:
“the examination of the nature of the site where the constitutional
violation took place, with the emphasis on US control of the territory
in question.” 98

91. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2004–05 (2017).
92. Id. at 2005 (“The panel held that Hernández lacked any Fourth Amendment
rights under the circumstances, but that the shooting violated his Fifth Amendment
rights.”); see also Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 272 (2014). But see
Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 2015) (wherein the Fifth
Circuit conducted a rehearing en banc, and while the court was divided as to whether
Mesa’s actions constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment, the panel
unanimously concluded that any Fifth Amendment right Hernandez may have had
was not clearly established at the time of the incident).
93. See Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 266.
94. Id. at 2007.
95. Id. (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017)).
96. Id. at 2008–09.
97. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1391 n.138.
98. Id. at 1392. See infra Section I.D.
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Scholars have pointed out that Hernandez was improperly
analogized to Verdugo-Urquidez in that the concerns over the
warrant requirement are “inapplicable to excessive deadly force
claims against U.S. government agents,” since there is “no concern for
potential conflict of laws or conflicts with foreign sovereigns” in the
latter situation regardless of whether the foreign national is
technically within U.S. territory or on the Mexico side of the border. 99
Instead of considering where the constitutional violation took place as
mandated by Boumediene, the Court analyzed only the citizenship
and status of the petitioner, which inevitably led to a formalistic
analysis based mostly on citizenship. 100 Consequently, lower courts
have no guidance on how to apply the Constitution abroad to settle
such disputes. 101
D. The Detainee Cases and Extraterritoriality
Following the War on Terror, a new series of cases regarding the
applicability of constitutional protections to enemy combatants made
their way to the Supreme Court, resulting in several opinions that
tested executive authority to designate individuals as enemy
combatants and hold them without counsel or judicial review.102
These cases have been notorious for their rejection not only of
absolute territorialism, but also of the Executive’s claim of power to
detain these suspects without certain Constitutional restraints. 103 The
conflict between individual liberties and the authority of the
Executive was prevalent during this era. 104 The result was simply the
decision that the Executive is not exempt from judicial scrutiny. 105

99. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1396.
100. Id. at 1399–1400.
101. See Alexandra A. Botsaris, Note, Hernandez v. Mesa: Preserving the Zone of
Constitutional Uncertainty at the Border, 77 MD. L. REV. 832, 832 (2018).
102. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466 (2004). See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
103. Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) after
9/11, which authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force”
against those determined to have “planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks” of 9/11 or those who “harbored such organizations or persons” in
order to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United States. See Authorization
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107‐40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224 (2001). It was the
position of the Bush Administration that the AUMF provided the military with the
authorization to hold and detain military combatants. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509–
11, 517.
104. See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2017.
105. Id. at 2018.
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In Rasul, the Supreme Court held that the federal habeas statute106
extended to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 107 The foreign national
detainees filed habeas corpus petitions, claiming that they were
detained in Guantanamo without being charged with a crime and
without access to counsel. 108 Here, the Court refused to delineate a
distinction between foreign nationals and U.S. nationals for purposes
of the habeas statute’s coverage. 109 The statute’s grant of jurisdiction
to federal courts, coupled with U.S. control over Guantanamo, led the
Court to conclude that the detainees at Guantanamo had the right to
habeas under the statute. 110 The Court distinguished the present case
from Eisentrager, finding that the Rasul petitioners “[were] not
nationals of countries at war with the United States”; they
“den[ied] . . . acts of aggression against the United States,” “[had]
never been afforded access to any tribunal,” and for over two years
“[were] imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and control.” 111 Because of this, the foreign
nationals at Guantanamo were “no less than American citizens,” and,
as such, were “entitled to invoke the federal courts’ authority under §
2241.” 112
The Supreme Court also decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the same
year. Hamdi was a U.S. national who the U.S. government alleged
was an enemy combatant. 113 Importantly, the Court acknowledged
that “the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2018). The Habeas Corpus Statute grants federal courts
jurisdiction over habeas petitions to “any person” as opposed to “any citizen” who is
“held in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the U.S. or
United States.” Id. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3); see Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, noted that the Lease Agreement from 1903 states that the
United States recognizes Cuba as the ultimate sovereign over Guantanamo, with the
United States able to exercise complete jurisdiction over the area. Rasul, 542 U.S. at
480.
107. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
108. Id. at 471–72.
109. Id. at 474–75 (“Consistent with the historic purpose of the writ, this Court has
recognized the federal courts’ power to review applications for habeas relief in a wide
variety of cases involving executive detention, in wartime as well as in times of peace.
The Court has, for example, entertained the habeas petitions of an American citizen
who plotted an attack on military installations during the Civil War . . . and of
admitted enemy aliens convicted of war crimes during a declared war and held in the
United States . . . .”).
110. Id. at 484 (“We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their
detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.”).
111. Id. at 476.
112. Id. at 481.
113. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
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independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core
rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be
heard by an impartial adjudicator.” 114 It is the responsibility of the
judiciary, absent suspension of the writ by Congress, to review the
legality of executive detentions whether in times of military conflict
or not. 115 Therefore, detainees who are U.S. citizens are “entitled at a
minimum to notice of the Government’s claimed factual basis for
holding him, and to a fair chance to rebut it before a neutral
decisionmaker.” 116
Some scholars have noted that there was no need to distinguish
between places where the United States has control and places where
the United States has sovereignty, since the Court has clearly stated
that “Guantanamo is functionally U.S. territory that our government
controls and, as such, the federal courts are authorized to grant relief
under the habeas statute.” 117 These holdings direct courts to treat
Guantanamo as a United States territory for purposes of habeas
relief. 118 However, territoriality is not a helpful standard since the
consideration of the Constitution’s applicability “will produce
different answers depending on whether we define territory by
technical notions of sovereignty or by practical considerations of
jurisdiction and control.” 119 Nevertheless, other scholars contend that
these opinions have not clearly addressed why detainees have
constitutional rights in Guantanamo. 120 Is it merely based on the fact
that the detainees are human beings, or because of the unique
character of the authority of the United States over Guantanamo? 121
As a direct response to Rasul, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), a jurisdiction-stripping statute
designed to prevent federal courts from adjudicating petitions for
writs of habeas corpus from detainees at Guantanamo Bay.122

114. Id. at 535.
115. See id. at 535, 537.
116. Id. at 533.
117. See, e.g., Azmy, supra note 67, at 405.
118. See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2059.
119. Id. at 2060 (noting that this approach “might also depend on how we construe
the location of the acts complained of”).
120. See Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (2005) [hereinafter
Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology].
121. Id.
122. See Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–06, 119 Stat 2680 (2005).
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld clarified the legality of this statute in 2006.123

Here, Hamdan, a Yemeni national, filed a petition for habeas,
claiming first that the military commission convened by the President
lacks authority under congressional acts and the common law of war,
and second, that the procedures used to try him violate martial and
international law. 124 The Supreme Court grappled with the issue of
whether the military commission had the authority to try Hamdan
and whether the Geneva Convention could be relied on in such
proceedings. 125 The Supreme Court held that the DTA did not apply
to cases that had already been pending at the time Congress passed
the statute. 126 The procedures of the military commission violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Common Article 3
of the Third Geneva Conventions. 127 Justice Stevens noted that the
President does not have the authority to promulgate an executive
order creating military commission procedures that depart from the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 128 Justices Kennedy and Breyer, in
concurring opinions, noted that the President could always get the
necessary approval from Congress. 129
In response to the Hamdan decision, Congress enacted the Military
Commission Act (MCA) in 2006. 130 Section 7 of the MCA amended
the federal habeas statute to strip the jurisdiction from federal courts
over pending and future habeas petitions to entertain petitions for
writs of habeas on behalf of an individual detained by the United
States “who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.” 131
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Boumediene v. Bush, where
the Court was tasked with determining whether the jurisdictionstripping provision of Section 7 of the MCA was constitutional and,

123. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94 (2006) (“Neither [the AUMF
or the DTA], however, expands the President’s authority to convene military
commissions.”).
124. Id. at 567.
125. Id. at 571.
126. Id. at 575–76.
127. Id. at 613, 635.
128. Id. at 613, 623 (“The UCMJ conditions the President’s use of military
commissions on compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also
with the rest of the UCMJ itself . . . . The procedures that the Government has
decreed will govern Hamdan’s trial by commission violate these laws.”).
129. Id. at 636.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2008).
131. See id. § 2241(e).
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ultimately, whether the Suspension Clause extended habeas to
detainees at Guantanamo. 132 Boumediene ultimately confirmed that
foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo as unlawful alien
combatants have the constitutional right to challenge the lawfulness
of their detentions via habeas corpus petition before U.S. district
courts. 133 While the majority accepted the fact that the United States
did not have de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo, it noted that this
has not always been the “touchstone of habeas corpus jurisdiction.” 134
In other words, even though Cuba had ultimate sovereignty over
Guantanamo, the United States was still found to exercise “complete
jurisdiction and control.” 135
The Boumediene Court identified three factors to consider when
determining the propriety of extending constitutional rights to foreign
nationals: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” 136 This test has been
promoted as a functional, pragmatic, multi-factor balancing test and
regarded as a rejection of the prior formalistic, absolute approach to
determining the geographic scope of constitutional rights.137
Considering these factors, the Court concluded that “Art. I, § 9, cl. 2,
of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” 138
Justice Kennedy based his conclusions on the control that the
United States did exercise over Guantanamo Bay. 139 The petitioners
were not U.S. nationals, but rather enemy combatants whose
detentions occurred outside the sovereignty of the United States;
however, U.S. control over Guantanamo was different than the
situation presented in Eisentrager. 140 Thus, the Supreme Court

132. Id. at 732 (“Petitioners present a question not resolved by our earlier cases
relating to the detention of aliens at Guantanamo: whether they have the
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in
conformance with the Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.”).
133. Id. at 793, 795.
134. Id. at 755.
135. Id. at 753.
136. Id. at 766.
137. Id. at 764 (“[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and
practical concerns, not formalism.”).
138. Id. at 771 (concluding that the detainees were “entitled to the privilege of
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention”).
139. Id. at 755.
140. Id. at 766–67.
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concluded that an extension of the Suspension Clause would not be
“impracticable and anomalous” under these circumstances.141
Furthermore, the precedents from the Insular Cases and Reid v.
Covert were found to “undermine the Government’s argument that,
at least as applied to noncitizens, the Constitution necessarily stops
where de jure sovereignty ends.” 142
Boumediene was celebrated because it allowed detainees to resort
to the courts to determine the lawfulness of their detention, and the
government was no longer exempt from judicial scrutiny. 143 Habeas
has traditionally been, and remains, the “sword and shield in the long
struggle for freedom and constitutional government,” which acts as “a
potent weapon against tyranny in every form and guise.”144
Boumediene was also significant in that the functional approach —
the “impracticable and anomalous” standard — that had been urged
in prior concurrences had finally found expression in Justice
Kennedy’s majority. 145 However, the opinion appears to be based
less on citizenship as it would initially seem, and instead more on an
expanded definition of territory. 146 It should be noted that the result
may differ if the detainee is outside both the United States and
Guantanamo. This implies that Boumediene did not set forth a clear
mandate to utilizing the functional approach, since it “did not
explicitly overrule the formalist approach,” and may also — whether

141. Id. at 770.
142. Id. at 755.
143. See FARRELL, supra note 68, at 10 (tracing the history of how the “writ of
habeas corpus was transformed by judges from a tool to exert state authority to one
that would be used to regulate government power”).
144. See United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Regan, 86 F. Supp. 382, 388 (N.D. Ill.
1949).
145. See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 843 (“Evidently, this decision declined to
follow the formalist precedent and relied primarily on functionalist thinking.”); see
also Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 27, at 282 (“With regard
to citizens, in one sense the Boumediene opinion merely repeats what both Kennedy
and Rehnquist seemed to be saying in Verdugo-Urquidez. Rehnquist explicitly
described the selective (functional) approach articulated in the concurrences by
Harlan and Frankfurter in Reid v. Covert — rather than Black’s plurality opinion —
as controlling the overseas application of the Bill of Rights to citizens.”); Rotstein,
supra note 44, at 1392 (“First, the sufficient connections test proposed by VerdugoUriquidez, which the Hernandez court relied exclusively upon, is not good law as
Boumediene essentially overruled it.”).
146. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754 (“Indeed, it is not altogether uncommon for
a territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation, while under the plenary
control, or practical sovereignty, of another. This condition can occur when the
territory is seized during war, as Guantanamo was during the Spanish-American
War.”).
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inadvertently or not — have left the door open for other formalistic
approaches. 147
Several inconsistencies remain even after Boumediene. For
instance, the opinion does not directly answer the question of “what
entitles someone to constitutional protection.” 148 Boumediene did,
however, effectively repudiate Verdugo-Urquidez’s holding that
noncitizens with no connection to the United States have no
constitutional protections. 149 But in doing so, Boumediene inevitably
“opened the door for a wider range of noncitizens to claim
rights . . . .” 150 It also left unclear the applicability of this functional
approach to situations involving locations other than Guantanamo,
where the United States holds and detains foreign national terrorism
Professor Anthony Colangelo has noted that, if the
suspects. 151
Court continues to use de facto sovereignty — which he describes as
“both complete control and complete jurisdiction such that U.S. law
and the U.S. legal system govern the territory” — then those in other
sites holding detainees will likely not be extended the same habeas
protections afforded to those at Guantanamo. 152 In moving forward
after Boumediene, some scholars have offered theories that promote
the starting of judicial analyses with “examining the nature of the
control of the United States over the foreign territory in question”153
or “first address[ing] the scope of government power on its own terms
before discussing applicable rights.” 154

147. See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 843 (noting that “the Court left open two
routes to the extraterritorial analysis based on opposing theories of legal
interpretation”).
148. See Bitran, supra note 2, at 240; see also Neuman, Extraterritoriality, supra
note 7, at 1460 (“Still, for the sake of other rights it would have been helpful if the
majority had hinted at the circumstances that can provide a starting point for
applying the functional approach to the rights of noncitizens.”).
149. Bitran, supra note 2, at 248.
150. Id. at 248–49 (“If the Court was willing to grant constitutional protections to
alleged enemies of the state, surely it would consider extending rights to noncitizens
outside U.S. custody who are far from a battlefield and unlikely enemies.”).
151. See Zachary M. Vaughan, Note, The Reach of the Writ: Boumediene v. Bush
and the Political Question Doctrine, 99 GEO. L.J. 869, 870 (2011); see also Neuman,
The Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 27, at 278.
152. See Anthony J. Colangelo, “De facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 663, 667–68 (2009) (“Thus, if the Court continues to use
the jurisdictional aspect of de facto sovereignty to inform the constitutional scope of
habeas, as it did in Boumediene, noncitizen government-designated enemy
combatants detained in Afghanistan and Iraq likely will not constitutionally have
access to the writ.”).
153. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1398.
154. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 22, at 884.
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E. The Territory-Citizenship-Enemy Model
The Territory-Citizenship-Enemy Model proposes a means of
organizing and analyzing the Court’s rationale at various
jurisprudential junctures, when the Court was tasked with deciding
whether, and how, to extend constitutional protections in different
situations. It traces the evolution of the Court’s priorities as between
territory, citizenship, and enemy status considerations. This Model
characterizes the holdings of only the Supreme Court and does not
account for the analyses of the lower courts in each case.

As suggested by the Model, In re Ross turned more on territory
rather than citizenship. 155 Later, in the Insular Cases, territorial
considerations continued to take center stage in the Court’s analysis.
This trend continued in Eisentrager — a case in which the Court’s
prioritization of territory considerations, over citizenship and enemy
status, was perhaps the most evident.
Reid, however, departed from this trend, with the opinion focusing
on citizenship as the determinative factor. Reid started a movement
based on the notion that courts “reject the idea that when the United
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of
Rights.” 156 In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, U.S. jurisprudence first

155. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
156. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
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hears the words “impracticable and anomalous” 157 as a standard for
determining when and to what extent the Constitution should be
applied extraterritorially in certain circumstances. Reid marked the
end of the formalistic approach and the beginning of an era of the
functional approach.
Interestingly, in the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion, the Court seemed
to revert to a more formalistic approach in its holding: the Fourth
Amendment only protects “the people” of the United States and is
not intended to apply its protections to “aliens outside of the United
States territory.” 158 However, the case is somewhat inconsistent with
precedent, as it failed to appreciate the significance of the “generous
and ascending scale of rights” from Eisentrager regarding the
connections of a foreign national to the United States. 159
Again, the Court pivoted meaningfully in the early 2000s, when
faced with a series of cases regarding the War on Terror. These cases
seem to reject territorialism or at least the general understanding of
Rasul and Hamdi both
what a United States territory is.
demonstrated the willingness of the Supreme Court to extend rights
to foreign nationals outside the United States. 160 Hamdan may be
considered somewhat of an anomaly that does not clearly advance the
analysis proposed by this Model, as the decision turned mainly on
separation of powers principles. 161 Boumediene, which tested the
Executive’s ability to gain more power in detaining suspects at
Guantanamo, reflected the Court’s attempt at balancing
considerations of territory, citizenship, and enemy status in its
analysis. However, the territory prong retained its expanded
definition, since in Boumediene, territory was based on U.S. control
over Guantanamo. 162 Finally, in 2017, Hernandez saw a return to the
formalistic approach, with a greater emphasis on the citizenship prong
than on territory. 163

157. Id. at 74.
158. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990).
159. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
160. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004).
161. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
162. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 754–55 (2008).
163. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2008 (2017).
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II. APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTENSIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Part II discusses the three approaches the Supreme Court has
considered when adjudicating the scope and extent of the
Constitution’s application.
These three approaches are best
demonstrated in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions of
Verdugo-Urquidez. 164 Cases similar to Verdugo-Urquidez have
turned largely on context — namely, on the Court’s approach at a
given historical moment and the specific facts of each case. 165 This
Part also analyzes a matrix of possible solutions, dependent upon the
territory or citizenship prongs, to illuminate the subtle differences in
case outcomes.
A. The Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions of Verdugo-

Urquidez

The first approach was demonstrated in Justice Rehnquist’s
majority — or more appropriately, the plurality — opinion. 166 Under
this first approach, U.S citizens have some (but not absolute)
extraterritorial constitutional rights, while foreign nationals do not. 167
This approach recognizes the importance of extending the
Constitution’s protections to its own nationals but stops short of
providing those same guarantees to foreign nationals.
The second approach derives from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in Verdugo-Urquidez. 168 Under the second approach, “[f]or both
citizens and aliens, a contextual, due-process-style analysis” is utilized
to determine which constitutional guarantees would apply and
whether adherence to that constitutional guarantee would be
“impracticable and anomalous.” 169

164. See supra Section I.C. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990).
165. For a discussion of other cases where the holding was dependent upon the
time it was decided, see supra Part I.
166. Id. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra
note 120, at 2075.
167. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra note
120, at 2075–76 (“U.S. citizens have extraterritorial constitutional rights and foreign
nationals do not. Even as to citizens, the Bill of Rights does not apply fully and
literally overseas.”).
168. Id. at 2076.
169. Id.
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The third approach appears in Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Verdugo-Urquidez, 170 where he argues that it is counterintuitive for
the United States to be able to enforce laws abroad but not be bound
by the mandates of the Constitution. Professor Neuman notes that
this approach “presumes that the extension of U.S. constitutional
rights accompanies the assertion of an obligation to obey U.S. law.”171
While the Constitution should apply to all persons — including nonU.S. nationals — within the United States and territories and all U.S.
citizens extraterritorially, it should only apply extraterritorially to
foreign nations when the United States “seeks to impose and enforce
its own law.” 172 Ultimately, however, it must be noted that the
application of a constitutional right could produce different results in
domestic and foreign locations. 173
B. Matrix of Possible Situations and Corresponding Outcomes
Extraterritorial extensions of federal statutes primarily analyze the
location of the conduct that was subject to regulation. 174 In contrast,
when dealing with the extraterritorial extensions of certain provisions
of the Constitution, a claimant’s citizenship status has also been a
consideration, in addition to territoriality. 175 Therefore, depending
on the claimant’s nationality and the location of the conduct, the
results will differ substantially. The four situations are displayed
below along with the most notable cases that have characterized each
situation. 176

(1)

(2)
U.S. National
U.S. Conduct

Non-U.S. National
U.S. Conduct

Incorporation Cases; Insular Cases

Insular Cases

170. Id.
171. Id. at 2077.
172. Id. (“[C]onstitutional rights should presumptively apply to all persons within
U.S. territory, and to all U.S. citizens in any location, but that extraterritorial rights of
foreign nationals presumptively arise only in contexts where the United States seeks
to impose and enforce its own law.”).
173. Id.
174. See CLYDE SPILLENGER, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 409 (2010).
175. Id.
176. Id. This chart has been adapted from Spillenger’s book.
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(4)
U.S. National
Non-U.S. Conduct

Non-U.S. National
Non-U.S. Conduct

Reid v. Covert

Verdugo-Urquidez

As demonstrated above, because Situations (1) and (2) involve
U.S. conduct within the territory of the United States, the Bill of
Rights is fully applicable to both U.S. and foreign nationals. 177 This
makes citizenship irrelevant where the conduct is in the United States
and has been reflected in judicial and legislative precedent. 178
Situation (3) involves conduct not in the United States, but as
pertaining to a U.S. national. While the right to a trial by jury and
indictment by grand jury extended to the claimants in Reid, the Court
held that constitutional extensions do not apply in every circumstance
when a U.S. national is abroad. 179 Situation (4), denoting non-U.S.
nationals and non-U.S. conduct, is the arguably most problematic,
because it involves the least connections to the United States. Such
incidents usually arise with the United States-Mexico border.180
Verdugo-Urquidez is an example of Situation (4). While the Fourth
Amendment did not extend in that case, the Court held that it is not
necessarily the case that no provisions of the Bill of Rights could ever
be applicable to non-U.S. nationals in situations involving conduct not
in the United States. 181
III. THE PROPRIETY OF, AND BASIS FOR, EXTENDING
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
The key issue surrounding these debates of whether to construe
constitutional extensions formalistically or functionally rests on the
question: What is the propriety of, and basis for, extending
constitutional protections to foreign nationals abroad? Rather, why

177. Id.
178. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2128 (“[B]y the
accumulation of judicial and political precedent we have implicitly adopted a
rebuttable presumption that noncitizens peacefully in the United States can claim the
same constitutional protections for civil liberties as citizens.”).
179. See SPILLENGER, supra note 174, at 411.
180. See generally Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
181. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990).
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restrict the extension of constitutional protections to citizens? 182 The
Court has used many different approaches, with no one prevailing
theory. These inconsistencies in rationales are reflected by the
Insular Cases, Reid, and Verdugo-Urquidez. 183
The Supreme Court has found support for extending protections to
foreign nationals under certain circumstances. The War on Terror
cases 184 demonstrated the judicial receptiveness to extending
constitutional guarantees to foreign nationals, even enemy
combatants, and hold the Administration liable for attempts to
circumvent the Constitution or the separation of powers principles.
The Court went so far as to either discount the traditional
considerations of citizenship and territoriality. 185 This resulted in
Boumediene, a controversial case for its adoption of the functional
approach. Additionally, promoting a global due process approach to
constitutional rights fails for “its lack of textual anchor and its
unpredictability.” 186
There are also arguments supporting the functional approach.
These arguments are mostly based on morals and on the notion that
people feel secure under the law by “[k]eeping [the] U.S. as a zone of
civil liberty for both citizens and noncitizens” and ensuring that “all
humans have equal dignity.” 187 This “equal dignity” argument has
been prevalent among academics and advanced as a means of
“balance[ing] liberty and security.” 188 Furthermore, restricting the
current functional approach or returning to a purely formalistic
standard ignores the impact of globalization in exterritorial
regulation, law enforcement, and information technology.189

182. See Neuman, Whose Constitution?, supra note 2, at 981 (“Once the taboo
against treating constitutional rights as effective beyond the nation’s boundaries has
been overcome, the question arises whether this development should be restricted to
citizens.”).
183. Id. at 975.
184. See supra Section I.D. See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
185. For a discussion of case law relying on citizenship considerations, territorial
considerations, or a combination of both, see supra Section I.E.
186. See Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra
note 120, at 2083.
187. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2126, 2133.
188. See Cole, supra note 5, at 388 (noting that “we should respect the equal
dignity and basic human rights of all persons”).
189. See Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology, supra
note 120, at 2078.
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Therefore, scholars promoting these arguments conclude that
territoriality is “a poor fit in an increasingly interconnected world.” 190
However, these considerations are quickly dismissed, since the
ability of the judiciary to consider these would likely lead to great
judicial deference. 191 The courts would be required to make
“complex factual assessments and predictions about which rights
would be workable to observe in which extraterritorial national
security settings, untethered from any textual guidance.” 192 This type
of power lies outside the competence of the judiciary and could
potentially hinder the government’s ability to react quickly and
flexibly to sensitive matters. 193 It is imperative that the Executive be
given the latitude to swiftly respond to threats to U.S. national
security. But it does not follow that the government may act free of
the Constitution under certain circumstances, as Boumediene
demonstrated. Nevertheless, there are some issues that Boumediene
did not dispel.
As mentioned, Boumediene created a vacuum, which resulted in a
circuit split. Currently, there are two approaches courts utilize when
analyzing the geographic scope of the Constitution: (i) the “voluntary
connections” test established in United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez,
and (ii) the objective factor analysis of Boumediene v. Bush. 194 These
seemingly opposite approaches – the formalistic and functional
interpretations, respectively — are problematic in that the Court has
not been forceful in asserting which predominates. 195 By the time the
Supreme Court decided Hernandez, instead of embracing the
opportunity to either promulgate an appropriate standard or
affirmatively mandate either the formalistic or functional approach, it
instead incorrectly applied Boumediene’s objective factor analysis
and returned exclusively to Verdugo-Urquidez. 196 Thus, by ignoring
precedent, the Hernandez decision creates more inconsistencies in the
lower courts, has “unfoundedly restricted, rather than expanded, the
rights of foreign plaintiffs” from seeking relief under the Constitution,
and “perpetuates a system of lawless law enforcement at the border at
the expense of innocent human lives.” 197

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Roosevelt III, supra note 90, at 2032.
See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2131–32.
Id. at 2132.
See id.
See Botsaris, supra note 101, at 853.
See id.
See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1400.
Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Globalization implies — if not mandates — harmonization:
protecting due process with consistency, while simultaneously
remaining wary of venturing too close to infringing on the sovereignty
of other foreign states, 198 respecting international comity, and
observing jurisdictional barriers. Therefore, an approach that allows
U.S. agents to operate in a foreign state without any accountability is
clearly not the solution. In some instances, the Constitution must be
applied abroad not only to extend protections to foreign nationals,
but also to provide assurances that U.S. conduct will be subject to the
constraints of the Constitution. The result is two-fold: (1) extend
constitutional protections to foreign nationals abroad, and (2)
supplement those extensions with accountability and constraints when
U.S. agents are acting abroad. To accomplish this, the Supreme
Court must settle the matter conclusively: whether the primary
emphasis should be on territory or citizenship. 199 This Essay argues
that territory — albeit a more expansive definition of territory — is
superior.
The importance of the citizenship distinction is decreasing, as are
the barriers of territory and enemy status as impediments to
Consequently, the
extraterritorial constitutional extensions. 200
extension of protection is becoming more uniform throughout U.S.
national security policies. 201 But should the United States provide
constitutional protections to all persons, regardless of citizenship, in
the United States during times of peace? 202 Should “the right to
habeas corpus at the international level . . . be available to everyone,
regardless of location or status”? 203 The United States still needs
some predictability and consistency — and this would likely be going
too far. 204
It is incumbent on the courts to strike the right balance between
the need to respond swiftly to national security threats, and the need

198. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 121 (“Having one sovereign intrude upon the
domain of another was widely seen as not only wrong, but dangerous.”).
199. For a discussion of case law detracting emphasis away from enemy status and
focusing instead on the prongs of citizenship and territory, see supra Section I.E.
200. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2135.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2128.
203. See FARRELL, supra note 68, at 221 (emphasis added).
204. For a discussion of the most recent cases that provide either a functional
approach for consistency or a formalistic approach for predictability, see supra
Section I.C.
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for flexibility in policies designed to ensure that due process rights are
afforded to those the United States seeks to hold, detain, target, or
regulate. The “sufficient connections” test from Verdugo-Urquidez
ignores territoriality to the point of denying constitutional extensions
to areas where the United States exercises control but is not
sovereign. 205 Boumediene ignores both the situations where the
conduct has occurred outside the de jure or de facto sovereignty of
the United States and claimants with arguably sufficient connections
to the United States. However, neither approach is incorrect;
territorial considerations require a more functional approach, while
citizenship — or whether the claimant has sufficient connections to
the United States — should take a more formalistic approach. Thus,
the solution is not to select a single approach; because these kinds of
cases demand context-specific evaluation and solutions, one approach
should function as a supplement the other.
A. The Proposed Framework for Constitutional Protections
An approach that analyzes the facts of each case using a clear,
multi-step framework would promote consistency and predictability
in judicial decision-making and administration. Netta Rotstein
advances a three-step balancing test regarding the BoumedieneVerdugo-Urquidez debate: first, look to where the constitutional
violation occurred; second, consider the appellant’s legal status under
the “sufficient connections” test; and third, “evaluate the practical
obstacles” of extending the constitutional guarantee. 206 Distilled
down to two steps, this Section proposes a framework that expands
on Rotstein’s approach, as it: (1) allows for a consideration of de facto
and de jure sovereignty when determining the territory of the United
States for purposes of the place of the conduct; (2) provides an
extended categorization of nationality to encompass those claimants
who have attained sufficient connection to the territory — such as
U.S. permanent legal residents; (3) limits extensions to those
constitutional provisions already established by precedent; and (4)
includes built-in safeguards where the specific constitutional
guarantee does not extend extraterritorially under the framework,
such as diplomatic relations and cooperation among states.

205. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 841–42 (2008).
206. See Rotstein, supra note 44, at 1392 (advancing this three-step framework to
provide more consistency in the application of the Constitution abroad and to
attempt to resolve the Boumediene-Verdugo-Urquidez debate).
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This simplified framework recognizes the importance primarily of
territory, and secondarily of nationality. The territoriality prong at
Step 1 is a more functional approach, since it embraces Boumediene’s
expanded definition of territory. This basis for asserting the relevant
constitutional right is the expanded definition of territory as that
which the United States has either de facto or de jure sovereignty. 207
Thus, the Guantanamo Bay cases would be resolved by Step 1; the
Suspension Clause now appropriately extends to the detainees in
Guantanamo. 208 Similarly, if the area in question is not under the de
facto or de jure sovereignty of the United States, like Mexico, then
the specific constitutional guarantee will not be extended. 209 If the
constitutional guarantee is not reached at Step 1, then the analysis
proceeds to Step 2, which addresses the nationality or connection of

207. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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the claimant to the United States. 210 Step 2 provides a more
formalistic approach, since it would extend protections abroad only to
U.S. nationals or permanent legal residents. It is important not to be
too subjective in this step with respect to what it means to have a
sufficient connection. Therefore, logically, only permanent legal
residents of the United States would be able to satisfy the sufficient
connection to the United States under Step 2. 211
Hernandez is perhaps the most challenging case to fit into the
proposed framework. On the one hand, the conduct at issue 212
occurred in the United States, with the effects taking place marginally
outside U.S. territory. On the other hand, Hernandez was not a U.S.
national or a permanent legal resident of the United States.
Following the proposed framework above precisely would lead to the
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment should have been extended
in favor of Hernandez, because the conduct took place on the U.S.
side of the border. Instead, the Supreme Court side-stepped the issue
altogether by noting that extending the Fourth Amendment could
have far-reaching consequences. 213 Thus, lower courts are left
without a clear standard to guide them when interpreting the
geographic scope of these constitutional provisions under the facts of
each case. 214
B.

Reflections on the Proposed Framework and Other
Considerations

The United States does not occupy the same position it did over
200 years ago. The United states is now a global leader —
economically, politically, and socially. Most importantly, it is the
home of a great diversity of people. 215 A balance must be struck

210. Likewise, Step 2 also involves the cases involving Mexico. For instance, the
Constitution was not extended in Verdugo-Urquidez because the alleged illegal
search took place in Mexico.
211. This step here is similar to the circumstances of Reid v. Covert, where the
Constitution was extended in favor of U.S. nationals abroad. See 354 U.S. 1, 17
(1957).
212. See Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 136 (5th Cir. 2015).
213. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017).
214. For a brief discussion of the circuit split after Hernandez, see supra Section
I.E.
215. See Quick Facts: All Topics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225217#RHI225217
[https://perma.cc/N3LP-DEW9]. As of 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau reports a
population of 50.8% female. Id. Race origins include White alone (non-Hispanic):
60.7%; Asian alone: 5.8%; black or African American alone: 13.4%; and Hispanic or
Latino: 18.1%. Id.
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between retaining some degree of sovereignty for the United States
and foreign states, and maintaining predictability in the Constitution’s
application. Courts should interpret the Constitution’s scope within
the bounds of international law. 216 This method of interpretation
recognizes the inevitability of being part of a globalized world, the
importance of flexibility to the Executive, and the need for
consistency in the extension of certain constitutional provisions to
claimants, particularly foreign claimants.
It is important to recognize, however, that various checks on the
extension of constitutional protections exist. For example, although
the claimant in Verdugo-Urquidez likely had Fourth Amendment
rights and those rights were likely violated, it is also important to
remember that Mexican officials did approve the search of VerdugoThus, principles such as
Urquidez’s apartment in Mexico. 217
diplomatic relations can “check the degree to which the U.S. pursues
criminal investigations abroad.” 218
Other checks that affect whether constitutional protections will be
extended extraterritorially include “statutes, executive orders, and
discretionary policy decision[s]” that are based on both “reciprocity
[and] legitimacy.” 219 These work to enable the protection of non-U.S.
nationals, while also granting the U.S. government the requisite
flexibility to take other action where necessary. 220 Furthermore, such
an approach encourages multi-lateral cooperation and coordination
among states, as well as between the Legislature and Executive.
Ultimately, the approach adopted should be one of fairness and
practicality. If one views the Constitution as a rigid document
impervious to change, then the United States will be forced to justify
its decisions with rationales that are outdated and ill-suited for a
modern world. This inflexible approach would undoubtedly hinder
international cooperation and prevent “harmoniz[ation]” of
“divergent national rules.” 221 However, if one views the Constitution

216. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 189 (observing how “[e]xtraterritoriality was
no longer limited to weak or peripheral states; it was now used against some of the
most powerful states in the international system . . . ”).
217. See SPILLENGER, supra note 174, at 415.
218. Id.
219. See Kent, Citizenship and Protection, supra note 10, at 2132.
220. Id.
221. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 120–21 (while observing that “[t]he most
familiar way to harmonize divergent national rules . . . is the negotiation of
international agreements,” the United States’ “expansion of extraterritoriality in the
postwar era is best understood as an alternative to more familiar cooperative
efforts”).
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as a living document that changes with every judicial opinion, every
president, or every major political era, then its vitality and strength as
a governing document of stability will be severely undermined. This
view subjects the United States to the whims of popular opinion.222
Thus, the answer should lie between these two extreme ends.
V. URBAN POLICY: FEDERAL INACTION AND THE PROBLEMS
FACED BY STATES AND CITIES
The Constitution’s reach has been extended to provide protections
to U.S. nationals who were charged with crimes abroad and to cover
foreign nationals within the territory of the United States. It was
logical for the Constitution to follow its nationals abroad and
guarantee to them the same protections had they been within the
territory of the United States. It was similarly logical for the
Constitution’s protections to extend to foreign nationals within the
United States who had begun to form a bond with the territory, utilize
its resources, and contribute to its development. But if these
extensions are accepted as logical, then how can opinions such as
Verdugo-Urquidez or Hernandez be justified?
States and cities can – and should – play a role in resolving this
issue. Change often starts small, and begins locally, before a more
sweeping national movement can be advanced.
States and
municipalities occupy a uniquely powerful position as actors, given
their ability to understand, and respond to, particular local realities,
given their proximity to the people.
Some maintain that state governments should be involved in
determining and facilitating the extension of constitutional
protections, because both the Constitution and the principles of
federalism grant them that right. For instance, states have “sovereign
rights regarding the treatment of individuals within their borders”;
they can make autonomous law enforcement decisions to promote
public safety. 223 The Constitution carves out space for the states to

222. Id. at 216 (noting that Boumediene’s focus on practicality, for example,
implies that constitutional issues are not fixed in time and that certain factors are
“subject to change given technological and political developments” and that “[w]hat
was impractical one day might become practical in a future day”).
223. Cara Cunningham Warren, Sanctuary Lost? Exposing the Reality of the
Sanctuary-City Debate and Liberal States- Rights Litigation, 63WAYNE L. REV. 155,
171 (2018).
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exercise police power. 224 Each state has a legitimate interest in
protecting and promoting the health and safety of all residents within
its jurisdiction; this naturally includes those undocumented
noncitizens residing within a state’s borders. 225
But state-centric solutions may not be feasible. Under the doctrine
of preemption, federal law governs the entire field of immigration,
based on expressed congressional intent to do so. 226 Should states
attempt to bypass federal law, they will likely be met with hostility.227
On the other hand, it is difficult for Congress to develop a
comprehensive immigration plan that considers the varying
circumstances of those it will encompass via its regulatory scope. If
Congress will not act, and the states are either forbidden from or
interrupted in proactively taking the first step, it is hard to imagine
how and whether consistency in the Constitution’s administration will
be achieved. Additionally, states are not themselves immune from
the effects of the sharp political divide in the United States today,
which presents one of the greatest hurdles to making serious plans for
extended and harmonized constitutional guarantees. 228 Invariably,
state efforts to deal with these problems have fallen short. Localities
have responded by taking matters into their own hands and serving as
sanctuary cities, declaring themselves as safe-havens for immigrants
and guardians of the rights of “outsiders.” Sanctuary city laws are
“designed to embrace a diverse and inclusive vision of community.”229
Sanctuary cities are a prominent example of how local jurisdictions
have resisted the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Many
localities see sanctuary as necessary to prevent harm to their
communities, as well as to express their disagreement with federal

224. Peter Margulies, Deconstructing “Sanctuary Cities”: The Legality of Federal
Grant Conditions that Require State and Local Cooperation on Immigration
Enforcement, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1508, 1510 (2018).
225. Id.
226. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (“The plenary authority of

Congress over aliens under Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, is not open to question . . . .”).
227. See Mark S. Grube, Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano
v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration
Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 394 (observing that in some contexts, such as
employment, courts have tended to use the “preemption doctrine to reach a desired
result” as opposed to utilizing a more “principle-based analysis”).
228. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 1, at 225 (asserting that some critical issues within
the United States create a tendency to move those activities offshore and
demonstrating “how territoriality has been manipulated to strategic advantage”).
229. Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1703, 1709 (2018).

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

639

immigration policies. 230 Local efforts to provide protection to
vulnerable foreign nationals in a particular jurisdiction has also been
grounded in the rationale that immigration is inherently a local
matter: namely, policies to protect immigrants “preserve local
sovereignty, define local priorities, and enhance community trust in
law enforcement.” 231
But as cities promote sanctuary policies, there has been
simultaneous legislation to strip the states of federal funding. 232 This
is further evidence of the “deepening divide” between the federal,
state, and local governments and the American people regarding the
issue of unauthorized immigration. 233 Despite these tensions, states
and cities continue to push back, motivated by the “concern that
entangling police with immigration enforcement erodes trust among
minority community members,” the “commitment to preventing
improper discrimination in policing based on race, ethnicity, or
national origin, and the “wish to express disagreement with federal
immigration policy.” 234 Therefore, it is evident that a comprehensive
analysis of U.S. immigration law requires recognition of the role
played not only by the federal government, but by proactive nonfederal stakeholders – “states, cities, individuals, and other private
actors.” 235
CONCLUSION
This Essay has presented an in-depth analysis of trends in the
rationales of the U.S. Supreme Court when deciding the geographic
scope of the Constitution as applied to U.S. and foreign nationals.
The Court’s approach to the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution
has changed, with earlier cases adopting an approach based on
territorialism, followed by considerations of the claimant’s citizenship.
Recent cases tend to ground their holdings in domestic concerns, such
as the separation of powers or national security matters. This is
particularly evident in the wake of 9/11, with the War on Terror cases.

230. Id. at 1708–09.
231. Id. at 1709.
232. Christopher N. Lasch, Sanctuary Cities and Dog-Whistle Politics, 42 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 159, 161 (2016).
233. See Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed
Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 171 (2016).
234. See, e.g., Lasch et al., supra note 229, at 1753.
235. Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The New Sanctuary and
Anti-Sanctuary Movements, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549, 553 (2018).
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However, the measures taken by the executive and legislative
branches have been too extensive and arguably intrusive in the era of
the War on Terror.
It has been unclear whether the determinative factor in judicial
analyses for extraterritorial extensions of the Constitution should be
based on territory or citizenship. The uncertainty peaked with
Hernandez, because the Court obviated any consideration of
reciprocity by avoiding a resolution of constitutional issues altogether.
Cases involving Guantanamo Bay and the United States-Mexico
border have been, and continue to be, the subject of significant
controversy. Scholars continue to struggle as to whether a formalistic
approach is superior over the functional approach.
This Essay promotes a balanced approach to account for presentday realities: a combination of Verdugo-Urquidez’s formalistic
approach and Boumediene’s functional approach. Context matters.
Territory is the single-most significant consideration that the Supreme
Court needs to evaluate. A combination of these theories supports
consistency in the application of the Constitution abroad, provides a
clear standard for lower courts to follow, gives the Executive its
needed flexibility in dealing with national security matters, respects
foreign states’ sovereignty by avoiding unnecessary infringements,
and affords foreign claimants the fair administration of certain
constitutional guarantees.

